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Abstract
This paper studies the e⁄ects of Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity, on
entrepreneurial choice. By distinguishing between risk and ambiguity, we
￿rst show that ambiguity aversion makes it less likely that an individual will
become an entrepreneur. It is also shown that an increase in ambiguity un-
ambiguously reduces the amount of investment. In the presence of borrowing
constraints, the less ambiguity averse is the individual, the more likely is his
or her investment to be constrained. More importantly, constrained wage
workers, who would become entrepreneurs in the absence of credit market
imperfection, emerge if and only if the market wage is high enough. These
individuals are characterized by an intermediate degree of ambiguity aversion.
When interpreting these constrained wage workers as managerial and profes-
sional workers, our model predicts the rise of such workers in the process of
economic development.
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Starting a new business is fraught with uncertainty. First and foremost, entrepre-
neurs must organize and manage their businesses, and above all, they must take full
responsibility. This does not involve the repetition of well-known daily work tasks.
As Knight (1921, p.299) states, ￿the entrepreneur ... takes over all the uncertainty
of the business along with control over it￿(emphasis added). He also claims that
￿[t]he inseparability of the uncertainty problem and the managerial problem￿is ￿es-
pecially important in the discussion of entrepreneurship￿(p.259; emphasis added)
and that ￿true uncertainty ... accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur￿
(p.232).
It is well known that by uncertainty, Knight (1921) meant unmeasurable un-
certainty, which he proposed should be distinguished from risk, or what he called
measurable uncertainty. While it seems di¢ cult to distinguish empirically between
risk and ambiguity,1 Engle-Warnick, Escobal, and Laszlo (2011) ￿nd that it is am-
biguity aversion that better predicts farmers￿decisions about the adoption of new
technology.2 Their empirical ￿ndings thus naturally motivate us explicitly to take
real uncertainty into account in studying entrepreneurship as a nonroutine task in
the spirit of Knight (1921). Formal analysis, however, has yet to be developed,
mainly because a tractable way of dealing with Knightian uncertainty in applied
economic research has been developed only recently.
In this paper, we propose a formal, yet tractable, model of entrepreneurial choice
based on the idea of Knight (1921). What are the e⁄ects of uncertainty on indi-
viduals￿decisions about whether to become entrepreneurs? Our theoretical model,
1In the past, there has been some skepticism about this distinction in the context of entrepre-
neurship. For example, Schultz (1980) stated that ￿(Milton) Friedman does not believe that this
is a valid distinction. He follows, as I do, L. J. Savage in his view of personal probability, which
denies any valid distinction along these lines.￿(p.440)
2Engle-Warnick, Escobal, and Laszlo (2011) study the OLS estimates of the risk aversion vari-
able and of the ambiguity aversion variable in a linear regression model, using experimental data of
Peruvian farmers. For experimental studies on ambiguity aversion, see, e.g., Ahn, Choi, Gale, and
Kariv (2011), who consider a portfolio choice problem, and Asano, Okudaira, and Sasaki (2011),
who investigate the validity of Nishimura and Ozaki￿ s (2004) model of job search under Knightian
uncertainty.
1in which there is no credit market imperfection, predicts that ambiguity aversion
makes it less likely that an individual will become an entrepreneur. It is also shown
that an increase in ambiguity unambiguously reduces the amount of investment. We
then incorporate borrowing constraints into the model. This is motivated by our
recognition that in reality, individuals cannot borrow as much as they want. In the
presence of borrowing constraints, the less ambiguity averse is the individual, the
more likely is his or her investment to be constrained. More importantly, constrained
wage workers, who would otherwise become entrepreneurs, emerge if and only if the
market wage is high enough. These individuals are characterized by an intermediate
degree of ambiguity aversion. When interpreting these constrained wage workers as
managerial and professional workers, our model predicts the rise of such workers in
the process of economic development.
The distinction between risk and uncertainty made by Knight (1921) is perhaps
most vividly illustrated by the following Ellsberg paradox, which casts doubt on the
validity of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory axiomatized by Savage
(1972). Consider a bet on drawing a blue ball from two urns. Two urns include
100 balls whose colors are blue or red. One urn includes 50 blue balls and 50 red
balls. In the other urn, the numbers of blue and red balls are unknown. Ellsberg
(1961) provides experimental evidence that, in this situation, most people prefer
the ￿rst urn to the second one. The reason is that most people dislike a situation
in which probabilities are not uniquely assigned. Ellsberg (1961) points out that
people prefer bets with known probabilities to those with unknown probabilities. In
the spirit of Knight (1921), uncertainty captured by a set of probability measures
is called Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity (these terms are used interchangeably
throughout the paper). On the other hand, uncertainty captured by a unique prob-
ability measure is called risk. In order to overcome the shortcomings of standard
expected utility theory, nonexpected utility theories have been proposed in the litera-
ture.3 A seminal paper is by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Since the publication of
3For introductory accounts of non-expected utility theories, see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995, Chapter 6), Hansen and Sargent (2008, Chapters 1 and 19), Gilboa (2009) and
Wakker (2010).
2the paper by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who provide the axiomatic foundations
to analyze behavior under ambiguity, the distinction between risk and ambiguity
has been considered important for explaining a number of economic phenomena.4
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize the Max-min Expected Utility (MEU) the-
ory, under which the beliefs of a decision maker (DM) are represented by his or
her set of probability measures, and in which his or her preferences are represented
by the minimum of his or her expected utilities over his or her set of probability
measures.5 Therefore, MEU theory is appropriate for analyzing a DM￿ s cautious or
conservative behavior if this behavior cannot be explained by SEU theory.6
In this paper, we follow Evans and Jovanovic (1989) to model entrepreneurial
choice, and we follow Miao (2004) to model Knightian uncertainty. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to consider the e⁄ects of borrowing constraints
on entrepreneurial choice in the presence of Knightian uncertainty. We show that
the presence of borrowing constraints a⁄ects entrepreneurial choice in a nontrivial
way.7 While risk-neutrality is assumed as in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), we assume
that individuals are heterogenous in terms of ambiguity aversion. We ￿nd that there
is a negative correlation between ambiguity aversion and entrepreneurship, which is
reminiscent of van Prrag and Cramer (2001) who take into account risk aversion and
entrepreneurial ability to analyze the individual decision to become an entrepreneur.
Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2011) also share with us the notion that
4There is a large literature on the e⁄ects of ambiguity aversion in ￿nance: see, e.g., Dow and
Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein and Miao (2003), and Asano (2006, 2010a).
5From another point of view, Schmeidler (1989) proposes the Choquet Expected Utility Theory,
under which a DM￿ s beliefs are represented by a nonadditive measure and in which, if the DM
satis￿es a set of axioms, his or her preferences are represented by the Choquet integral.
6Recent topics of research that apply the notion of Knightian uncertainty include job search
(Nishimura and Ozaki (2004)), sharing rules for partnership (Kelsey and Spanjers (2004)), ir-
reversible investment (Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) and Asano (2010b, 2010c)), Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies (Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2008)), and the tragedy of commons (Dia-
mantaras and Gilles (2011)).
7In a classic paper, Kihilstrom and La⁄ont (1979) propose an equilibrium model in which an
individual chooses between becoming an entrepreneur and becoming a wage earner. Their main
prediction is similar to both ours and those of Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2011): the less
risk averse is an individual, the more likely is he or she to become an entrepreneur. Although their
analysis is motivated by Knight (1921), Kihilstrom and La⁄ont (1979) develop a model using the
framework of risk and standard expected utility. Thus, their notion of heterogeneity in individual
attitudes toward risk does not capture ambiguity aversion in the sense of Knight (1921).
3￿entrepreneurial characteristics￿are related to tolerance to ambiguity (rather than
to risk). Capturing the notions of optimism and pessimism through the use of be-
lief functions over returns that depend on new and old technologies, Rigotti, Ryan,
and Vaithianathan (2011) analyze individuals￿choices of occupation and technology.
That is, Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2011) analyze how individuals choose
between starting an entrepreneurial ￿rm and working in such a ￿rm, and how they
choose between adopting a well-known traditional technology and adopting a new
innovative technology. Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2011) show that three
types of ￿rms appear in equilibrium: (i) entrepreneurial ￿rms operating with tech-
nology that generates ambiguous returns, in which both owners and workers are
optimists; (ii) traditional ￿rms in which optimistic owners hire pessimistic workers
and operate with technology that generates more certain returns; and (iii) bureau-
cratic ￿rms operating with well-known technology in which both owners and workers
are pessimists.8
Whereas Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2011) consider a model of occupa-
tional choice based on the Arrow￿ Hurwicz (1972) criterion9 and analyze the e⁄ects
of heterogeneity in ambiguity tolerance, we study individuals￿occupational choices
based on Gilboa and Schmeidler￿ s (1989) formulation and analyze the e⁄ects on
occupational choice of the degree of ambiguity. Unlike Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithi-
anathan (2011), we take into account borrowing constraints.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce our
model. In Section 3, we present analytical results and numerical examples. After
the basic model is analyzed, we incorporate borrowing constraints into the basic
8Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2008) propose a general equilibrium model of occupational
choice in which new and old technologies are considered for the production of a single consumption
good. Assuming that the returns from the new technology are ambiguous and that the returns from
the old technology are risky but not ambiguous, Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2008) analyze
the e⁄ects of heterogeneity in ambiguity tolerance. They show that (i) the most ambiguity-tolerant
individuals own the innovative ￿rms operating with the new technology; (ii) the least ambiguity-
tolerant individuals work in ￿rms operating with the old technology; (iii) individuals who tolerate
ambiguity to an intermediate degree enter ￿rms operating with the new technology.
9The Arrow-Hurwicz (1972) criterion conceptualizes the idea that one￿ s preference is expressed
by the convex combination of the maximum and the minimum of the expected utility from an act.
With the criterion, ambiguity aversion is characterized by the weights of the convex combination.
4model. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we present and then parameterize our model. We follow Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) to model entrepreneurial choice, and we incorporate ambiguity
aversion ￿ la Miao (2004).
2.1 Setup
Let S be the set of states of the world, let F be a ￿-algebra on S, and let P be a
reference probability on (S;F). No information asymmetry exists. An individual is
endowed with the beginning-of-period wealth z > 0.10 This individual, by inelasti-
cally supplying a unit of labor, decides whether to become an entrepreneur (working
for himself or herself) or to become a wage earner (working for someone else). We
assume that these two alternatives are mutually exclusive.11 Conditional on his or
her occupational choice, the individual￿ s (gross) income is given by:




w if he or she is a wage worker
f(k;e ￿) if he or she is an entrepreneur,
where w > 0 is the (nonstochastic) wage that can be earned as a wage worker in the
competitive labor market,12 k ￿ 0 is the amount of physical capital invested in the
entrepreneurial project, ande ￿ is a technological shock or a nonsystematic interruption
to production, which is a random variable on a probability space (S;F;P) (speci￿ed
in the next subsection).13 We term f(￿;￿) the entrepreneurial production function in
10The beginning-of-period wealth may come from wages obtained as a worker and/or from an
endowment from parents.
11We assume away disutility from labor and any labor market imperfection. Thus, having no
employment (or ￿being unemployed￿ ) is not an option for the individual.
12We include hired managers in this category in the spirit of Knight (1921), who claims that
￿[w]e must refuse to be misled by the super￿cial similarity between the daily work of the hired
manager and that of the man in business on his own account￿(p.297; emphasis added) and that
￿[w]ages of management are not di⁄erent in principle from wages for routine work￿(p.309).
13We assume that the production contribution by the individual as an entrepreneur is separable
from that contributed by any other individuals who work for him or her. By making this assump-
5the spirit of Knight (1921) and Lucas (1978).14 We assume that for any realization
of ￿, f(￿;￿) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es the Inada conditions
(f(0;￿) = 0, limk#0 @f(k;￿)=@k = 1, and limk!1 @f(k;￿)=@k = 0). An individual
who has decided to become an entrepreneur must invest a positive amount of physical
capital. Hence, the individual becomes an entrepreneur if and only if k > 0. The
amount of consumption is given by:
e c = e c(k) ￿ e y + (1 ￿ ￿)k + (1 + r)(z ￿ k);
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate and r ￿ 0 is the risk-free interest rate.15
We interpret e ￿ in the production function as a source of ambiguity. There are a
number of possible sources of ambiguity in the business project. Knight (1921) points
out that ￿[t]he main uncertainty which a⁄ects the entrepreneur is that connected
with the sale price of his product￿(p.317). This type of uncertainty typically comes
from the inevitable time lag between the (contractual) purchase of capital (i.e.,
(1+r)k)16 and the sale of the ￿nal output (e y).17 The real uncertainty is considered
to re￿ ect the subjective evaluation of the production technology by the individual.
On the other hand, it would be reasonable to assume that wage work has no such
ambiguity. Furthermore, for tractability, w is assumed to be a nonrandom variable.
In order to model the entrepreneur￿ s pro￿t maximization problem under Knight-
tion, we can count as entrepreneurs small business owners or managers who hire wage workers as
well as the self-employed.
14Knight (1921, p.305) states: ￿The independent entrepreneur is not yet by any means an extinct
species. Such a person typically furnishes both property and labor services to a business, meaning
by labor services personal activities which might be hired and paid for with a ￿xed wage. The
entrepreneur income in a case of this sort contains an element of wages as well as an element of
interest.￿
15We assume that the interest rate for k is also r. That is, there is no distinction between
lending and borrowing rates. However, as Evans and Jovanovic (1989, p.813) point out, because
￿nancial intermediaries ￿do not appear to ￿ne-tune risk premia to individual borrowers￿ , this is a
simplifying assumption.
16If an entrepreneur also hires wage workers (not modeled in this paper), to this cost is added
wage payments.
17Knight (1921, p.309) also mentions ￿true uncertainty￿in estimating ￿human capacity￿ . This
interpretation would apply not only to the evaluation of any wage workers hired by the entrepreneur
but also to himself or herself. Takii (2003) proposes the broader concept of the entrepreneur￿ s
prediction ability, which he interprets as entrepreneurial ability, in the framework of standard
expected utility theory. See subsection 2.3 for a discussion of how the work of Takii (2003) relates
to ours.
6ian uncertainty, we follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).18 Let M be the set of all
probability measures on (S;F), and let P ￿ M be a set of probability measures that






with respect to k ￿ 0 (occupational choice). If this set of priors P is reduced to a
singleton, i.e., P = fPg, then the individual faces only risk, and thus, ambiguity
disappears.
2.2 Parameterization
To proceed further, we make parametric assumptions about the randomness in en-
trepreneurial production. We assume that the entrepreneurial production function
has the Cobb￿ Douglas form: f(k;e ￿j￿;￿) = e Ak￿, where e A ￿ ￿e ￿ represents the pro-
duction shock, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the rate of return on business capital.19 We assume
that e A is multiplicatively decomposed into (i) ￿ 2 (0;￿), which is interpreted as the
individual￿ s (nonrandom) entrepreneurial ability,20 and (ii) the technological shock,
which is the only source of ambiguity (and risk) for the individual.
Next, we introduce our parametric assumptions about decision maker￿ s set of
priors. In this paper, an individual￿ s set of probability measures describes ambiguity
itself and ambiguity aversion. As clearly seen in the objective function of an agent,







where P is his or her set of probability measures, f is some function from the state space S into
some set of outcomes X, and u is his or her felicity function.
19Here we assume that the error term appears in an exponential term. Why we use this speci￿-
cation is that it allows the log-linearization
lny = ln￿ + ￿lnk + lne ￿,
and that it is also adopted by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). In fact, some of the results depends
on this functional form.
20The range of values for ￿ is restricted to ensure that the second-order condition is satis￿ed.
There may be ambiguity about ￿, as suggested by Knight (1921) (see footnote 17 above). However,
in this paper, for analytical simplicity, we do not allow heterogeneity in ability.
7a larger set of probability measures provides a lower expected utility to the agent.
Our interpretation is based on Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) who propose the
de￿nition of absolute and comparative ambiguity aversion: they provide a behavioral
foundation for interpreting an agent￿ s set of probability measures as the degree of
ambiguity. This interpretation is adopted by Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) and Miao
and Wang (2011). Similarly, the parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the degree of
Knightian uncertainty. In the following analysis, we interpret, as Cao, Wang, and
Zhang (2005) do, the variation in ￿ as heterogeneity among individuals with respect
to attitude toward ambiguity, rather than the intrinsic ambiguity to which a business
project may pertain. The reference probability P is thus interpreted as a re￿ ection
of the intrinsic nature of a business opportunity, which is assumed to be common
for all individuals.
Another related work is Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004). Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) provide a normative foundation to distin-
guish a decision maker￿ s ambiguity and her attitude toward it. In their framework,
￿-Maxmin Expected Utility (henceforth, ￿-MEU) is derived as a special case.21 In
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci￿ s (2004) model, a decision maker￿ s set of
priors captures ambiguity itself, and the parameter ￿ captures her attitude toward
ambiguity. These two notions are clearly distinguished. If her set of priors is sin-
gleton (i.e., C = fPg), then ambiguity disappears, and thus the standard expected
utility follows. If ￿ = 1, then her preferences are represented by ￿maxmin￿pref-
erences. On the other hand, if ￿ = 0, then her preferences are represented by
￿maxmax￿preferences. Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004, Proposition
12) provide a normative justi￿cation for this way of interpreting the parameter ￿ as
21Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) provide a more general axiomatization theorem
than ￿-MEU (see also Ja⁄ray (1989)). More speci￿cally, let S be a set of states of the world, ￿ be
an algebra of subsets of S, X be a set of consequences, f : S ! R be a ￿nite-valued ￿-measurable
function, and B0(￿) be the set of all real-valued ￿-measurable simple functions. Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) show that if a set of axioms is satis￿ed, then there exist some
set C of probability measures on (S;￿), a nonconstant a¢ ne function u : X ! R and ￿ 2 [0;1]












Based on Kogan and Wang (2002) and Miao (2004), we specify a structure for
P. This speci￿cation enables us to derive clear analytical results.22 We consider the
















where M denotes the set of all probability measures on (S;F), dQ=dP is the den-
sity of Q with respect to P, and ￿ ￿ 0 captures an individual￿ s degree of Knightian
uncertainty, as explained below. As explained by Kogan and Wang (2002), the intu-
ition for the speci￿cation P(P;￿) is as follows. An individual is not perfectly certain
about the reference probability measure P. This reference probability measure P
may be interpreted as the true probability measure. However, his or her set of pri-
ors is not so large that it covers the set of all probability measures. Because the
individual faces such ambiguity, he or she assumes that each element in P(P;￿) is
a possible alternative to the reference probability P.
Let Q be an element in P(P;￿), and let dQ=dP be its density. One way to
evaluate the alternative is to use the relative entropy index, EQ[log(dQ=dP)]. This
index can be interpreted as an approximation to the empirical log-likelihood value.
We then assume that the set of priors for e ￿ is the class of normal distributions (for
tractability). Speci￿cally, we let the reference probability P be the normal distribu-
tion with mean ￿￿ and variance ￿2
￿. Furthermore, we assume that an individual has a
set of probability measures de￿ned by set (1), all of which have normal distributions
with a variance ￿2
￿ and a mean ￿￿￿v for some v 2 R. Note that v can take negative
values. Therefore, the mean ￿￿ ￿ v is not always less than that ￿￿. As proved by














22Based on the approach proposed by Kogan and Wang (2002), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005)
analyze limited market participation under Knightian uncertainty and show that limited market
participation can be explained endogenously by considering Knightian uncertainty and heteroge-
neous uncertainty-averse investors.
9This formulation leads to the following property: the larger ￿, the larger V(￿), which
expands the individual￿ s set of priors P(P;￿). On the other hand, as in standard
analyses, we assume that the notion of risk is captured by the variance ￿2
￿.
Two comments are in order. First, as do Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) and
Wang (2004), in this paper, we consider a situation in which the entrepreneur has
a precise estimate of the variance ￿2
￿ but is not perfectly certain about the mean
of e ￿ because of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Second, the case of ￿ = 0
corresponds to the situation in which an individual is ambiguity neutral.
2.3 Interpretation of the Parameter ￿
In this paper, we interpret ￿ as re￿ ecting heterogeneity among individuals with re-
spect to attitudes toward ambiguity. This is because the larger ￿, the larger the
individual￿ s set of priors P(P;￿), which implies that the individual assumes various
scenarios including the best and worst ones. Based on this interpretation, the in-
verse ratio, 1=￿, can be interpreted as a measure of ￿prediction ability￿ . Remember
that the larger is ￿, the less con￿dent is the individual about what the actual prob-
ability is. The source of this anxiety may be one￿ s innate or learned characteristics.
Under this interpretation, individuals di⁄er in their prediction abilities. According
to Takii (2003), prediction ability re￿ ects how accurately an entrepreneur interprets
a realized signal in predicting productivity. By contrast, in our model, prediction
ability directly re￿ ects ambiguity and its relation to entrepreneurship.
3 Analysis
Remember that the individual becomes an entrepreneur if and only if the optimal
amount of the capital investment k > 0. In this section, we ￿rst solve for the optimal
k and then study its characteristics. We then analyze how the existence of borrowing
constraints changes the results.
103.1 Entrepreneurial Investment and Occupational Choice
under Ambiguity
The individual is assumed to face model uncertainty and to be ambiguity averse. We
also assume that the individual must decide on the investment level (i.e., whether
to become an entrepreneur) before the realization of e ￿. Let the entrepreneur￿ s (mul-
tiprior expected) pro￿t or net business income (given k > 0) be denoted by:












(￿￿ ￿ v) ￿ (￿ + r)k
= Ak
￿ ￿ (￿ + r)k,
where the ￿rst equality follows from the de￿nition of ￿(k;e ￿) ￿ ￿k￿~ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿
(1+r)k, the second equality follows because the set P(P;￿) is isomorphic to the set
V(￿), and ~ ￿ is distributed with a mean ￿￿ ￿v and a variance ￿2
￿, and A, de￿ned by:











2). Note that the entrepreneur imagines the worst prospects for his or
her business (i.e., v =
p
2￿￿￿). Our interpretation is that individual heterogene-
ity in the population comes from the recognition that what constitutes the worst
prospects varies across individuals depending on their own sets of priors, although
all individuals have some conception of what are the worst prospects. The entre-
preneur then solves maxk￿0 V (k). The ￿rst-order condition for an interior optimum
is:
￿Ak
￿￿1 ￿ (￿ + r) = 0.








This k+ is the level of capital that is optimally chosen by the individual who has
(not necessarily optimally) decided to become an entrepreneur. What are the e⁄ects
11of risk (￿￿) and of ambiguity (￿) on the optimal level of capital investment (k+)?
As intuition suggests, an increase in either risk or in ambiguity leads to a lower level
of investment. This is because it is reasonable for greater ￿ uctuations to make an
individual￿ s decision more conservative. Not only risk but uncertainty also captures
the conservativeness in investment.
Proposition 1. Both an increase in risk or an increase in ambiguity reduce the
optimal level of investment (@k+(￿, ￿￿, ￿￿, ￿, ￿)=@￿￿ = ￿(
p
2￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)A)k+ < 0
and @k+(￿, ￿￿, ￿￿, ￿, ￿)=@￿ = ￿(
p
2￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)A)k+ < 0).
The multiprior expected net business income under k+ is now given by:
V













The individual becomes an entrepreneur if and only if the wage that can be earned is
no greater than multiprior expected net business income (remember that we ignore






k+(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) if w ￿ V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿)
0 if w > V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿).
Note that if ￿ = 0, the set of priors P is a singleton, and the preceding analyses
capture the situation with no ambiguity. Our formulation allows one to interpret
23The e⁄ects of risk aversion on the optimal amount of investment within the framework of the
mean-variance preferences of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) are worth being analyzed. Note
that mean-variance preferences are represented by the following:




where P is the reference probability measure and ￿ is a measure of risk aversion. Generally, it
is not always ensured that within the framework of MEU, DM￿ s preferences can be written in an
additive form as above. Thus, in this paper, we do not consider the interaction between ambiguity
aversion and risk aversion within the framework of mean-variance preferences, which is clearly
an interesting future topic. See Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) and Maccheroni,
Marinacci, Rustichini, and Taboga (2009) for this issue.
12￿ as a subjective assessment of the degree of ambiguity. However, in what follows,
the variation in ￿ is interpreted as heterogeneity among individuals with respect to
attitudes toward ambiguity. This enables us to analyze how individual di⁄erences
in ambiguity a⁄ect occupational choice. First, we derive the following proposition,
which establishes a threshold for ambiguity aversion, below which individuals be-
come entrepreneurs and above which they become wage earners.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the individual chooses to become an entrepre-
neur if he or she is ambiguity neutral (V ￿(0;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) > w). Then, there exists
a unique threshold, b ￿ = b ￿(w;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) > 0 such that individuals with ￿ ￿ b ￿ be-
come entrepreneurs and those with ￿ > b ￿ become wage workers, where b ￿ satis￿es
V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) = w.
Proof. It can be veri￿ed that V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) is continuous and strictly de-











and that lim￿"1 V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) = 0, which gives the desired result. Q.E.D.
This proposition can be interpreted as a formal statement of Knight￿ s (1921) in-
sights into entrepreneurship, as discussed in the Introduction: ￿ambiguity-bearing￿
is a key determinant of entrepreneurial choice.24 The next proposition establishes
an important characteristic of the threshold, b ￿.









which does not permit an interpretation as Proposition 2 above. If ￿ = 0, then we ￿rst have
@V ￿=@￿￿ = ￿￿V ￿(￿ = 0;￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) > 0. Because it is veri￿ed that
V ￿(￿ = 0;￿￿ = 0) > 0
, ￿ < 1,
we have a threshold b ￿", above which an individual chooses to be an entrepreneur, if the market
wage level w is high enough that w > V ￿(￿ = 0;￿￿ = 0).
13Proposition 3. An increase in entrepreneurial ability increases the threshold;
i.e., @b ￿(w;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿)=@￿ > 0.











This proposition states that individuals with great entrepreneurial ability are
more likely to become entrepreneurs, ceteris paribus. This is because their entrepre-
neurial ability enables them to tolerate more ambiguity in their future net business
pro￿ts. We also have @b ￿/@w < 0 (see Appendix): the more attractive the outside
opportunity (becoming a wage worker) becomes, the more likely are inframarginal
entrepreneurs (slightly below b ￿) to opt out of wage work. On the other hand, the
e⁄ect on the threshold of a marginal increase in the rate of return from business
capital (@b ￿/@￿) is indeterminate. This is because the e⁄ects of a small increase
in ￿ on the multiprior expected entrepreneurial pro￿t are twofold: it is associated
with an increase in k+ and, hence, an increase in the bene￿t A(k+)￿, and at the
same time, it also incurs the cost (￿ +r)k+. As is expected, we have @b ￿=@￿￿ > 0: a
marginal increase in the mean production shock makes inframarginal wage workers
(slightly above b ￿) become entrepreneurs. However, the sign of @b ￿=@￿￿ is indeter-
minate. Nevertheless, @b ￿=@￿￿ > 0 if and only if ￿￿ >
p
2￿. This means that if the
common variance of each possible distribution is large enough, then further increases
encourage more individuals to become entrepreneurs. An immediate result that is
relevant for the next subsection is that individuals￿initial wealth holdings do not
a⁄ect their (deterministic) prospects of becoming entrepreneurs.
Corollary 1. In the absence of imperfection in the credit market, whether an
individual chooses to become an entrepreneur is independent of his or her initial
level of assets, z.
This is because what matters to individuals is only whether they can obtain
14returns in the future by becoming entrepreneurs. Therefore, the level of initial
wealth does not a⁄ect entrepreneurial choice.
3.2 Incorporating Borrowing Constraints into the Basic Model
In practice, many prospective entrepreneurs cannot borrow as much as they want.25
In the literature on entrepreneurial choice, much attention has been paid to the
signi￿cance of borrowing constraints (or lack thereof).26 To determine the e⁄ects
of borrowing constraints on entrepreneurial choice in the presence of Knightian un-
certainty, as do Evans and Jovanovic (1989), we assume that there is an upper
bound for the amount of business capital: k must be no greater than ￿z, where
￿ ￿ 1 is a constant.27 Thus, if the individual (not necessarily optimally) becomes








(Note that once k$ = k+(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) is not chosen, then k$ = ￿z is (sub)optimal
because V (k) is increasing for k < k+.) The constraint is binding if and only if
k$ = ￿z. If the constraint is not binding, then the optimal solution is the one given
in the previous subsection. (Note that the limiting case of ￿ ! 1 corresponds to
the situation in which the individual faces no borrowing constraints.) Multiprior
25Knight (1921, p.364) recognizes this situation by pointing out that ￿the entrepreneur, as society
is organized, is almost always a property owner and must necessarily be the owner of productive
power in some form.￿(p.364)
26While Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and subsequent studies (such as those of Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a, 1994b), and Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000)) empirically emphasize
the adversarial e⁄ects of borrowing constraints in entrepreneurial choice, Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
present the opposite view that the signi￿cance of borrowing constraints may have been caused by
only a small fraction of those with higher amounts of net worth. See also, e.g., Cressy (1999), Cressy
(2000), and Harada and Kijima (2005), who also obtain results that contradict the (theoretical and
empirical) signi￿cance of borrowing constraints.
27The lower bound is exogenously given. To endogenize the borrowing constraint, one must
explicitly model how credit market imperfection induces the constraint. We assume that:









to ensure the existence and uniqueness of ￿, which is de￿ned below.
15expected net business income is now given by:
￿
V ￿(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) if the entrepreneur is unconstrained








￿ ￿ (￿ + r)(￿z).
An individual characterized by (￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿;￿;z) becomes an unconstrained entre-





1￿￿ (￿ + r)
￿￿ p
2￿￿
(uniquely) solves k+(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿) = ￿z with respect to ￿, so that ￿ is the thresh-
old that distinguishes between an individual whose investment is constrained when
becoming an entrepreneur and one who can invest optimally even when there are
borrowing constraints. The latter type of individual can become (not necessarily
optimally) an entrepreneur by choosing k$ = k+(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿). However, for an
individual with ￿ < ￿ who is courageous enough, his or her optimal level of capital
investment cannot be chosen if he or she (not necessarily optimally) becomes an
entrepreneur. This situation is depicted in Figure 1, where:
w ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + r)
￿
(￿z) ( ￿ w(￿z)).
It is also shown that [V ￿]0(￿) = [V C]0(￿) and that the second derivatives of both
functions are positive.
An individual characterized by (￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿;￿;z) compares the multiprior ex-
pected payo⁄ from becoming an entrepreneur with that from becoming a wage
worker. Thus, he or she (optimally) becomes a constrained entrepreneur if he or
she is su¢ ciently tolerant to ambiguity that his or her ￿ satis￿es ￿ < ￿, where:
￿ = ￿(w;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿;￿;z)
















Notice that although ￿ is independent of w, ￿ does depend on w. Now, we charac-
terize occupational choice under Knightian uncertainty in the presence of borrowing
constraints. First, we ￿x the value of the upper bound for business capital, ￿z.
Then, we obtain the following proposition about the characteristics of occupational
choice for alternative values of the wage. In particular, it shows that the monotonic
relationship between ambiguity aversion and occupational choice holds unless the
wage is extremely high or low.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the borrowing constraint for any prospective en-
trepreneur is binding (i.e., 0 < ￿z < [￿A=(￿ + r)]1=(1￿￿)). (a) If the wage is
low enough for w < w(￿z), then there exist three types of individuals: (i) con-
strained entrepreneurs with ￿ 2 [0;￿(￿z)); (ii) unconstrained entrepreneurs with
28minQ2P(P;￿) EQ[￿C(￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿;￿;z)] is de￿ned not only for ￿ < ￿ but also for ￿ ￿ ￿.
Clearly, ￿
C exists and is unique.
17Figure 2: Occupational choice in the presence of borrowing constraints
￿ 2 [￿(￿z);b ￿); and (iii) wage workers with ￿ ￿ b ￿. (b) If the wage is high enough
for w ￿ w(￿z), then there exist three types of individuals: (i) constrained entrepre-
neurs with ￿ 2 [0;￿(￿z)); (ii) constrained wage workers with ￿ 2 [￿(￿z);￿(￿z));
and (iii) wage workers with ￿ ￿ ￿(￿z).
Figure 2 clari￿es the statements in the proposition (bold lines depict the maxi-







(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + r)(￿z) ￿ ￿w
(￿z)1+￿ < 0.
This implies that an increase in the amount of beginning-of-period wealth makes
inframarginal constrained entrepreneurs unconstrained. Note that if (and only if)
b ￿ ￿ ￿, the presence of borrowing constraints prevents individuals in the middle
range of ambiguity aversion (￿ 2 [￿;b ￿)) from becoming entrepreneurs. Hence, we
summarize this argument, for comparison with Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. In the presence of borrowing constraints, constrained wage workers
(who would otherwise become entrepreneurs) emerge if and only if the wage is high
enough for w ￿ w(￿z).
This is because if the wage is su¢ ciently low, constrained multiprior expected
entrepreneurial income for any ￿ > 0 still exceeds the wage; thus, occupational
18choice is una⁄ected by borrowing constraints. Our results have implications for
economic development and occupational choice. Iyigun and Owen (1999) provide
empirical evidence that shows that in economies with higher per capita incomes, few
individuals are employers relative to the number of individuals who work for others.
If the market wage w rises as the economy develops, our model predicts a fall in the
proportion of entrepreneurs in the labor force. Iyigun and Owen (1999) also provide
empirical evidence that shows that the fraction of workers classi￿ed as managerial
and professional workers increases with per capita income. By interpreting the
constrained wage workers in the region of [￿(￿z);￿) as managerial and professional
workers (who earn wages), we also predict the rise of such workers in the process of
economic development.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the e⁄ects of ambiguity on entrepreneurial choice. We
show that ambiguity-averse individuals are less likely to become entrepreneurs. It
is also shown that an increase in ambiguity unambiguously reduces the amount of
investment. In the presence of borrowing constraints, the less ambiguity averse is
the individual, the more likely is his or her investment to be constrained. More
interestingly, we showed that constrained wage workers emerge if and only if the
market wage is high enough. By interpreting these constrained wage workers, who
exhibit an intermediate degree of ambiguity aversion, as managerial and professional
workers, our model predicts the rise of such workers in the course of economic
development.
Avenues for future research include the determination of consumption and sav-
ings decisions in a dynamic framework ￿ la Schjerning (2006) and Buera (2009).29
How are entrepreneurial choice and savings behavior related in the presence of am-
29Schjerning (2006) and Buera (2009) construct a discrete-time and a continuous-time in￿nite-
horizon model of entrepreneurial choice and savings behavior, respectively. See Adachi (2009) for
a ￿nite-horizon version of the dynamic model with many periods (considering one￿ s life cycle). See
also Malchow-Młller, Markusen and Skaksen (2010) for a dynamic analysis of the e⁄ects of labor
market institutions on entrepreneurial choice.
19biguity aversion? Numerical analysis is needed to answer this and other interesting
questions. This is because the consumption￿ savings problem is not well de￿ned
in the context of risk-averse utility. However, it is hoped that the analytical re-
sults obtained in this paper under the assumption of risk neutrality can be used to
generalize the formulation of utility. Although structural estimation of a model of
entrepreneurial choice incorporating ambiguity aversion and risk neutrality would
be useful, it would be more fruitful to estimate separately ambiguity aversion and
risk aversion in a coherent framework.
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Appendix: The Characteristics of b ￿(w;￿￿;￿￿;￿;￿)
Verifying the sign of each parameter requires a direct application of the implicit





























































= ￿1 < 0:
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